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III.—PSYCHICAL PROCESS.1
BY HABOLD H. JOACHIM.
§ 1. Two senses of 'Idea' have sometimes been contrasted,
and the contrast has been used to mark off the subject-matter
of Logic from that of Psychology. In order to bring the
problem of the present paper into focus, it will be convenient
to retrace this familiar distinction between Idea as meaning
and Idea as psychical fact. A rough outline will serve.
A judgment as 'meaning,' 'significance,' or 'logical con-
tent,' is a part of knowledge—so far, at least, as it is true.
This ' meaning' is something ' objective,' and common to all
sane intelligences.-' it is universal; independent of parti-
cular conditions of time and place, unless they are themselves
included in the meaning and thus universalised ; and it is
freed from the 'psychical setting,' which accompanies the
judging of this or that person. The judgment—in this sense
of the term—is a complex content, within which we may
distinguish contributory elements of meaning as its con-
stituent portions. Any such constituent portion is an ' idea ' ;
and, for our present purpose, may be called distinctively a
'logical idea'. For the further reflective classification of
Logic (with which we are not here concerned) every ' logical
idea' falls under one or other of a few types: it is, e.g., a
subject or a predicate, an antecedent or a consequent, and
so forth. And in the light of another classification (with
which we are again not concerned, but which is sometimes
ascribed to Metaphysics) every ' logical idea' is—or perhaps
we should say ' stands for'—a member of some type or other
within a different group. It is (or ' stands for') a sub-
stance or an accident, a quality or a relation, a cause or an
effect, and so forth.
1
 For the views 'expressed in the following paper (which was written
for the Jowett Society at Oxford during the summer of 1906) I am of
course alone responsible. But I gladly take this opportunity of express-
ing my gratitude to Mr. F. H. Bradley, who read through the manu-
script, and made many most valuable suggestions and criticisms.
' i . e . , if any sane intelligence thinks about the matter, it must think so
about i t
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66 HABOLD H. JOACHIM :
But every judgment is made by some person, and is thus
a judging. The judgment, as a judging, is a process. It is
an event, or, rather, a succession of events: a section, of a
certain length and breadth, taken in the conscious life of the
person judging. As occurring at, and through, a determinate
time, and as a process ' in ' or ' o f an individual mind, it is
unique or singular. And its parts or ' steps ' (the plurality
of succession, which analysis may distinguish withm its
unity), qud constituents of it, are themselves unique and
singular; just as the several events, which constituted the
flow of Napoleon's life, are—considered as this actual historical
process—unique and singular constituents of a unique and
singular total event
The process of judging, as ' in ' or ' of ' a mind, is called a
psychical process: and its parts are called psychical events or
facts, or (sometimes) ideas. An idea, therefore, in this sense
of the term, is a unique and singular ' step' in a unique and
singular process. Such ' ideas ' are the several changes ' in '
or ' of ' the individual mind, which constitute (or contribute
to constitute) that total flow of consciousness which is the
judgment as a judging.
sj 2. For the sake of simplicity, I have spoken only of
Judgment But mutatis mutandis the same distinction ap-
plies, e.g., to Inference, to Emotion, and to Volition. The
inference, as a piece of articulate meaning, is distinct from
the inferring as a psychical activity: the pain of parting,
or the emotion of love, from the psychical process of ex-
periencing the pain, or of falling and persisting in love. And
the processes of volition ' in ' the individual agents are dis-
tinguished from the subject of moral praise and blame, the
will incarnate in character and conduct or in the laws and
institutions of a people.
Problems, similar in kind to those which we are to study,
arise from the application of the distinction in these regions.
But it would be a mistake to extend the scope of an inquiry,
which—even if restricted to Judgment—is more than enough
to occupy us.
And there is a topic, which may be ruled out at once as
irrelevant, however interesting it might be in another con-
nexion. For when 'psychical process' or 'psychical fact'
is distinguished as singular and unique from the universal
content, the terms ' psychical process and fact' may express
not one factor over against another factor within a total
experience, but that total experience itself viewed on the
side of its existence. Feeling, willing, judging and in-
ferring occur aud exist in time and place, and have sever-
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PSYCHICAL PROCESS. 67
ally, in every instance, a determinate and unique position in
the complex of events which forms ' the world '. What is
known is somebody's knowledge, what is felt and willed is
somebody's feeling or willing: and my knowledge, emotion
or purpose, whilst embodying a universal content, is also
(taken in its entirety as an actual experience) a part of my
history. Psychical facts in this sense of the term—like all
' facts'—occupy, each of them, their definite positions in the
temporal and spatial order. And, in that sense, they are
severally unique and singular, however universal their con-
tent. They are studied by the historian, by the writer of
biography, and by many novelists. What exactly is studied,
and how the data for the study are obtained, is an interesting
and difficult problem. But we are not here concerned with
it We do not care where and when in the world-order a
judgment, inference, emotion or volition ' takes place' or
' occurs': nor are we occupied with the description of these
phenomena as the unfolding of a personality. We are to
examine ' psychical process' in another and more dubious
sense. Within the total occurring experience, we are to
suppose a distinction to be drawn and a severance to be
made. A judgment, as I make it, is my judging. And this,
my judging, (so it is supposed) is or involves some sort of
' process,' or ' mechanism,' or 'happening ' m or of my mind.
To what does this vague description apply? Wluit is this
' psychical process' ?
S 3. If I see a red thing, or hear a chord, I do not see or
hear or otherwise apprehend the processes of my seeing or
hearing. Whatever those processes may be—whatever the
physical and psychical mechanism of vision and hearing
—at least they are not what I see or hear or apprehend,
when I see the red thing or hear the chord. I am not aware
of the image on my retina, nor of the rods and cones, nor of
my organ of Corti: not aware of them, nor of any change in
them, nor of any ' psychical process ' (any modification of my
sentience) which accompanies—or which may be supposed to
accompany—these physical changes. What exactly I see or
hear—i.e., what is 'for me' as the object apprehended—is a
problem, which fortunately we need not here investigate
further. It does not matter to us at present whether we see
:
 colour' and hear 'sound,' or whether, e.g., we see wave-
lengths of the ether as colour and hear vibrations of the air as
sound. All that I am maintaining is this :—When we are see-
ing or hearing X (colour or sound or vibrations), we do not see
or hear or apprehend any process or mechanism—physical or
psychical or psycho-physical—which is (or may be) involved in
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6 8 HAROLD H. JOACHIM :
our seeing or hearing X. "We do not, in perceiving, perceive
the processes of our own percipience. Whatever these pro-
cesses may be, they are not something through peroeiving
which we perceive X: nor are they something which we
perceive along wtth X. For us, qud perceiving X, they are
nothing at all.
This seems so obvious in the case of perception, that I am
ashamed to dwell upon it. And it is surely no less obvious
in the case of judgment. For if I judge ' Caesar was a great
general' or ' Philosophy is full of intricate problems,' there
is something (as we say) ' before' my mind. In the judg-
ment I am analysing and synthesising, and thus apprehend-
ing, a complex real. We need not enter into the difficult
question as to what precisely I am apprehending:—what,
qud analysing and reconstructing, qud judging, I have ' be-
fore ' me. The greatness of Casar as a general, or the in-
tricacy of philosophical problems:—these may be treated for
our present purpose simply as ' X," a something real—a com-
plex object—which is ' for me ' qud judging. And in judging
and thus apprehending X, I neither judge, nor in any way
apprehend, along with X, any process of getting, or of having,
X Wore me. The ' psychical process' of judging X is no-
thing/or me, i.e. is no part of that which I apprehend in
apprehending X. And if the knowledge of X—the judgment
meaning X—is conditioned by a process of judging, the con-
ditioning process itself is nothing, of which I (in judging
and knowing X) am in any sense aware.
Whatever the process of judging may be, it is not some-
thing through the awareness of which we are aware of X :
nor is it something which we apprehend along with the
apprehension of X. For us, qud judging and thus apprehend-
ing X, the process of that judging is nothing at all.
• § 4. Our apprehension of the real neither includes for us,
nor is mediated by, the apprehension of any processes of that
apprehending. In perceiving or judging, we are not aware
of any changes or events ' in ' or ' o f our percipient or
thinking mind, whether as antecedent conditions or as part-
constituents of our perception or judgment. This seems to
me certain, and even obvious: and I would not have dwelt
upon it, if it were not sometimes forgotten. Since, however,
it may be misunderstood, and through misunderstanding
disputed, I will try to anticipate a possible objection here,
and thus throw this obvious (and somewhat trivial) conten-
tion into relief.
" Surely," jt may be said, " in the real world, as we appre-
hend it, there is a factor contributed by the mind. The
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PSYCHICAL PROCESS. 6 9
world which we perceive, and the world revealed and grasped
in judgment ana inference, is something from which we
cannot eliminate the work of perception and thought. You
have made things easy for yourself, by brushing aside the
question ' ttihat is for me qud perceiving or qua judging ?'
For if you had investigated this problem, you would have
found that the subject's psychical constitution and psychical
processes—the structure and the functioning of his percipient
and his judging mind—are vitally concerned in that appre-
hended real which you so conveniently designated as ' X '."
The reply to this criticism is, I think, simple. Whether
the critic's philosophy is sound or not—and I am not aaying
that it is unsound—his objection is irrelevant. For suppose
that X—what we apprehend qud perceiving or qud judging—
is through and through conditioned and characterised by
our psychical character and our psychical processes, my
position is still untouched. For what I have denied is (1)
that we apprehend those processes and through our awareness
of them apprehend X: and (ii) that we are aware of them as
part of X which we are apprehending. And this denial can
still be maintained. For let us call the psychical conditions,
which are supposed to contribute to X, ' Y'. Then, the ob-
jector urges " X—if you will reflect upon it—involves Y ".
But I am maintaining that Y—whether ' involved' in X
or not—is nothing, of which the subject, qud apprehending
X, is aware.
The irrelevance of the objection, in fact, is concealed by
the vagueness of the terms. One might agree with the
objector that the "structure and functioning of the per-
cipient and judging mind are vitally concerned in the ap-
prehended real,' and yet deny that the judging and per-
ceiving mind apprehended its own structure and functioning
as such, in apprehending the real: just as one might admit
that all clear thinking must conform to the Law of Con-
tradiction, without holding that the thinker must be aware
of that Law as a principle to guide his thinking, or as part
and parcel of what he thinks.
§5. For whom, then, is the 'psychical process,' which we
have assumed to be involved in the making of a judgment ?
Wlio is aware of it, and of what precisely is he aware? That
is the next question which must be asked, and the answer is
a painful one. I believe—to put the matter at once and
brutally—that no one is or can be aware of ' psychical pro-
cess ' in the sense of the phrase in which we have been
taking it. There is no such thing: or at least if there is,
it cannot be known. And though undoubtedly we are aware
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7 0 HAROLD H. JOACHIM :
of something, that—whatever we may choose to call it—is
not what we set out to discover.
Let me try to explain.
* If I—the judging subject—subsequently reflect upon my
judgment, I may detect and disengage and bring ' before'
my mind certain incidents and changes, which I take to
have been the ' psychical process' of the judging. In the
same way, you—the psychologist—may reflect on my judg-
ment aa a complex incident in my mental history: and, in
studying the conditions and the constituent parts of this
incident, you may suppose yourself to be studying ' the
psychical process ' which was ' my judging'.
You and I are, in such a case, studying a new ' real'. A
new object is ' before' our apprehension and judgment, which
we may call ' Q'. And our judgments, in which we ap-
prehend Q, are, as judgings, 'psychical processes' ' in ' or
' of' our minds. For the original distinction, between judg-
ment as universal meaning and judging as unique and singular
psychical process,1 will apply to every judgment, if it applies to
any. In virtue of that distinction, we looked for a ' psychical
process' in the judgment meaning X : and we found a judg-
ment meaning Q. On the same principle, we must look for
a ' psychical process' in the judgment meaning Q: and we
shall find a judgment meaning Z. We are in fact committed
to an infinite pursuit of that which, by the very terms of its
conception, cannot be caught or 'apprehended,' and refuses
to stand over against us as an object of our awareness. At
every step of the pursuit, the ' psychical process'—the pro-
eets of apprehending—eludes our grasp and leaves us in pos-
session of ejxobjeot of apprehension. What we set out to study,
waB—as we imagined—the living process of a judging mind :
the unique and singular series of changes which is that
mind's thinking. In making this ' psychical process' an
object of study, we have disengaged it from the mind whose
process it was. We have removed it from the atmosphere
in which it drew the breath of its life: and ' it'—the real
object of our search—has ceased to be. And whilst we
suppose ourselves to have it ' before us,' our study is fixed
upon a lay figure, a thing of straw and stuffing, a caricature
of the living process. That has slipped away:—only to revive,
in a mocking reduplication of itself, as the process of our
studying.
§ 6. There is a well-koown form of self-hypnotism by
which, if we ponder on even the commonest words of our
1
 Above, g 1.
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PSYCHICAL PBOCB8S. 71
vocabulary, we shall doubt their spelling, or their customary
meaning, or perhaps doubt in the end whether they are
significant sounds at all. Similarly, there is a kind of dia-
lectical reflexion, which brings the most, elementary dis-
tinctions—the most solid and familiar facts—into a whirlpool
of movement. There, everything proves self-contradictory,
and, turning confusedly into everything else, crumbles away
into nothing.
Now this—it may be suggested—is what is happening in
the present case. For ' psychical process ' and ' psychical
fact' may perhaps be ill-chosen expressions: but the pheno-
mena, which they indicate, are real, and no amount of
dialectical criticism can remove them from the universe.
Prove that a ' psychical process' is, by the very terms of its
conception, neither ' for ' the subject nor ' for' anyone elsa
Prove that ' to be itself' is incompatible with its being
known: and that ' to be known ' conflicts with its being
that which it is to be known as being. The contradiction
lies in the confusion of your thinking, and does not touch
the facts. The facts are there, solid and unyielding and
unaffected by the dialectical movement. For can it be
denied that there is a sense in which judgments ' occur' ?
Or that their ' occurrence' (the judging) is a process of
thinking and a functioning of the mind ? Or that the
phenomena thus indicated—their conditions and laws—are
possible objects of systematic study, forming indeed part of
the subject-matter of an actual science ?
Undoubtedly the facts—some facts, at least—are there,
and undoubtedly they are studied. But it is no empty ques-
tion to ask what are these facts, and what precisely is studied ?
And it was against one answer to this question that we were
arguing. For the ' facts' were characterised (in contrast to
the objective and universal meanings) as unique and singular
processes of the individual minds: and these—the unique
now of an individual consciousness, and its unique parts or
constituent ' ideas '—were to be the objects of study. Such
a psychical process, and such ideas (we argued) are nothing:
or if they are anything, at least they are not possible objects
of knowledge for anyone.
" In that case," it will be retorted, "your discussion is
waste of time. You have been forcing open doors, and
tilting at windmills. For the distinction itself is harmless
and indisputable, if rightly understood: whilst the abuse of
it, which you have been attacking, is nowherp to be found.
" In the judgment ' Caesar was a great general' there is
affirmed a complex meaning. And this affirmation of mean-
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72 HABOLD H. JOACHIM :
ing, as common and universal, as the meeting-ground of all
intelligences, as true or false, is a piece of knowledge or of
error, and comes under the study of the logician. But the
apprehending and affirming of the meaning is something
singular and unique: and the judgment is in this sense a
judging, an operation severally performed by each intelligence.
If I am to judge, I must bring the complex meaning before
my mind, and affirm the cohesion of its parts: and in so
doing, I must pass through complicated ' psychical processes'.
I must apprehend the several constituents—the ' logical
ideas,' e.g., Casar, General, Great—and I must apprehend
the manner of their cohesion, and affirm them in their
cohesion. All this—as it actually occurs—is a unique and
singular process, inseparable from the mind whose process
it is. But it nevertheless exhibits a certain general char-
acter, conforms to certain conditions and laws, and exempli-
fies certain typical dispositions and functions of mind. This
—the common character, the general conditions, the typical
functions, involved in the singular processes—is the subject-
matter of Psychology. For every science must in a sense
reflect upon the singular and unique. But every science
disentangles, from this material of its study, the common
nature and the universal laws which are, as it were, the
substance of the singular phenomena. In this respect the
procedure of Psychology is the same in principle as that of
other sciences, and is fully justified by its results. For it has
analysed this singular process, whereby the individual mind
transcends the limits of its singularity and grasps what is
universal. It has discovered and named a world of dis-
tinctions within the seemingly simple phenomena, from
which its investigation started. Thus it has distinguished
different types of ideas, images, or symbols as constituent
'steps' in the processes of the different types of mind, or of
the same mind as it thinks of different types of thing. It
has laid bare the conditions which determine the ' association '
of these 'ideas,' the different principles of connexion which
operate in the psychical mechanism. It has distinguished,
named and described the typical functions of the mind as
displayed in the more complex structures—the ' set pieces'
—of its self-expression, in imagination, memory, recollection,
inference and so forth. And by tracing the principles of inter-
relation, the affiliation and evolution of the different mental
functions and processes and structures, it has brought the
whole to order and system."
§ 7. The above, I am well aware, is a most inadequate
outline of the work achieved by Psychology in a small corner
 at The U
niversity of British Colom
bia Library on July 13, 2015
http://m
ind.oxfordjournals.org/
D
ow
nloaded from
 
PSYCHICAL PBOCE88. 7 3
of its field : but with that work we are not directly concerned.
The appeal to it is irrelevant, or perhaps an attempt to pre-
judice our inquiry. However much we may admire the
success of Psychology, we still have our problem to reckon
with. For the magnificence of a superstructure cannot of
itself guarantee the solidity of its foundations: and we do
not even know that these ' psychical processes' are the
foundations of Psychology. They may be neither the mate-
rials from which it starts, nor the foundations of its building,
but confusions and misconceptions which have no place in
any science. Or, if indeed some psychologists have built
upon them, and they prove unstable, Psychology can be
trusted to deal with the situation, to repudiate and, if ne-
cessary, to reconstruct.
Only one fresh point has been urged in the above defence
of ' psychical processes,' if we eliminate the bare assertion
that they are ' solid facts' and the appeal to the results of
Psychology. A severance is still made between what the
mind thinks and the process of its thinking. What it thinks
is a logical content, true or false, knowledge or error; and
is relegated to Logic. The ' solid fact6,' which are to remain,
are certain processes of thinking and certain ' steps ' in those
processea These, as actual, are ' singular and unique,' and
thus (in accordance with the original distinction) sharply
contrasted with the universal and common meaning, the
' logical content' and ' logical ideas '. But the ' singular and
unique,' we are now assured, is merely the starting-point of
an inquiry, which (as a ' science ') studies its ' substance '—
its common character and typical forms, its general laws and
conditions.
Now, in what tense are these processes ' singular and
unique' ? On this, as it seems to me, the whole matter
turns. For there is a sense in which all phenomena are
' singular and unique '. All phenomena, we may say, as they
actually occur, are severally fixed in determinate positions
within a complex of relations. And each of them is parti-
cularised by reflecting, with an ' emphasis' differentiated
by that position, the inexhaustible detail which constitutes
their common setting.1 But the 'psychical processes' are
' singular and unique' in a further sense. For any actual
thinking is, ad a 'psychical process,' inseparable from the
individual mind. It is 'unique and singular' not merely or
primarily because, as occupying a determinate position within
a complex system, it reflects the inexhaustible variety of its
1
 ('/. alx>ve, J 2.'
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74 HABOLD H. JOACHIM:
setting from this and not K/rom that angle. Its ' unique sin-
gularity ' is the privacy of the ' individual mind ' : a privacy
of exclusive 'bemg-for-self,' which is assumed to constitute
a mind's ' individuality,' and to cover all its inner modifica-
tions. What is ' singular and unique ' in this sense cannot
be ' given' or ' apprehended,' and cannot serve as the material
from which a science disentangles universal laws or the
typical forms of a common nature. Its very being is to be
inaccessible. For no curious observer can draw the curtains
of another's mind and peep at its inner workings: and not
even the judging subject himself can here act the part of
Paul Pry, observing the secret processes of his own judging.
Such psychical process is so singular that it eludes every
one's grasp and baffles all description. It is so unique, that
one may doubt whether it occurs even once.
§ 8. At the risk of insisting on the obvious, I will illustrate
this distinction between the facts, which are data for scientific
investigation, and the supposed ' facts of mind '. We are to
assume—rightly or wrongly—that there is an ' individual
mind' of or in which these processes are: for without this
assumption the whole position vanishes. Suppose, -then,
the mind were an inorganic thing—a piece of iron, e.g.—
whose behaviour under certain chemical conditions we wished
to study. This piece of iron is unique and singular, and
different from every other thing in the universe. But its
unique singularity is not a being-for-itself, an inner privacy
of self-feeling. Even if we imagine it to enjoy an exclusive
individuality of this kind—an individuality analogous to that
which we ascribe to ourselves and, with more hesitation, to
the animals and perhaps to the plants—no man of science,
no chemist, biologist or botanist, would regard such recesses
of incommunicable being as objects of study, or regret his
inability to enter into them. And if this piece of iron is
' uniquely singular," qud this determinate reflexion of an in-
exhaustible setting, it is not so that we observe it, when we
make it a starting-point of chemical inquiry, nor as such that
Chemistry endeavours to know it. We see, or infer by the
aid of experiment, a succession of changes, of displacements
of constituent particles, culminating in a determinate struc-
tural rearrangement. What we see, may be unique and
singular: but we do not see it in its unique singularity.
That it is unique and singular, in the sense that, if the
universe were exhaustively known, it would be exhaustively
known too, and would be revealed as an individual con-
stituent in the individual system which is the universe :
this may or may not be the case, but it does not concern
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our chemical inquiry. For that a more limited vision iB
sufficient. The piece of iron and its processes, as data for
Chemistry, are a limited group of properties and changes,
observed in the rough, in a general and typical form, with-
out that minute differentiation which, as these unique and
singular facts, they no doubt possess. We observe just so
much, and just so precisely, as is required for the formulation
of the law: "Iron (such and such a chemical element)
under such and such conditions combines with such and
such other elements to form such and such a compound :
and the process in, or of, the elements is such and such a
succession of displacements culminating in such and such a
structural rearrangement". '
And if the mind were a piece of mechanism, we should
have a datum before us, a perceptible thing, with a typical
structure and with laws of its working to be ascertained
by observation and inference. Even if we had nothing be-
fore us but this ' unique and singular' watch, and were igno-
rant of the purpose determining the material, shape and
adjustment of its parts, we should not necessarily be at a
loss. For, if it were set going, part would be seen acting on
part, and a series of displacements occurring. And if we
hesitated to infer " such and such an ordered arrangement
of such and such materials results in such and such a regular
movement of the hands and is intended to mark the time,"
our hesitation would not be due to the ' unique singularity'
of the datum. We might, in our ignorance, hesitate to infer
the actualisation of such a purpose anywhere. But if we
accepted it here, we should not hesitate to generalise; or
rather, in accepting it, we should already have generalised.
Kant, it will be remembered, proposesl to ' set the mind
going' in order to ascertain its ' faculties': the ' play' of the
mechanism is to reveal the nature of its parts and the prin-
ciples of their adjustment. But he meant that the nature
of mind is manifested in what it does: that we can infer its
distinctive ' powers,' only if we set it at work judging, feel-
ing and willing, and study the results. He never supposed
that the " inner psychical process " could be separated from
the meaning apprehended, or from the content felt or willed,
as the movements within the watch are separable from the
revolution of the hands on the face. And he certainly did
not suggest that by observing the mental machinery at
work—by looking (so to say) at the wheels going round in
1
 Cf. e.g., Kr. d. r. V.t 2nd edit., p. 91 ; ./. alao AY. d. Urtheiltkraft,
IntnxL, p. xin.
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the mind—one could formulate a theory of the typical forms
md general conditions of such "psychical process".
Now, I am not here questioning whether, if we could
apprehend the psychical process of any one individual mind,
we should be entitled to generalise (or should perhaps already
have generalised) from our data. I am maintaining simply
that the supposed data are not forthcoming. The ' psychical
process of an' individual mind,' if such there be, is ex vi
termtnorum, not capable of being ' given' to that mind itself,
or to any other mind. And if the psychologist attains to
knowledge of the nature and functioning of mind, the know-
ledge which he acquires, and his method of acquiring it,
must be other than we have been supposing.
S 9. We talk of ideas ' occurring to us,' ' flashing through
our mind,' being ' fixed in our head'. ' Trains of ideas '
rush through consciousness, impressions ' crowd ' upon us,
and images 'jostle' one another, or are 'stored,' in our
memory. We naturally lapse into the coarser and more
familiar categories, and should be indignant if our metaphors
were taken seriously. The mind, we are all agreed, if it is
anything at all, is not an extended whole. It is not—not
even from ' one point of view '—a one containing a plurality
in spatial juxtaposition, nor a place successively occupied by
a shifting manifold. It is one: but the unity is changing,
and changing so that the changes are modes of the unity.
It is a one-of-many : but the plurality, whether simultaneous
or successive, is phases of the one, and the one is ' one' only
in these its phases or ' inflexions'.
But if this is what we mean by a ' mind,' a mind is not
that in or of which processes are, nor that which owns
variety and change as its properties. It is not a ' thing' or
a ' substance,' but essentially itself a process. It is itself
variety and change: but the variety and the change are the
modes and inflexions of a one, which is ' one' only in its
inflexions, and is for itself only as reflected upon itself' in
them. This is what we are for ourselves at the most ele-
mentary level at which we experience ' ourselves ' at all:—at
the level of 'self-feeling'. There our 'self is a 'scale' of
feelings; a unity of feeling of which the many feelings are
the inflexions, and a unity which is ' one for itBelf' (a
' feeling of a self) as returning upon itself throughout the
plurality. And here, it may be said, in this unity reflected
upon itself in itB inflexions, we have the type of what is
called ' psychical process' and the clue to the ' psychical
process' of judging. For if the ' inflexions' are modifications
of a unity of awareness, if ' modes of awareness' are sub-
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stituted for ' modes of feeling,' the process is the mind
qud judging: and we have found the object of our search.
The mind in judging apprehends X : but, qud judging, the
mind is an awareness differentiated through many modes,
and ' one '• for itself by reflexion upon itself throughout these
inflexions. In this differentiated and reflected unity of
awareness, the mind is Y, the process of judging whereby
it apprehends X. The mind, as we rightly insisted,1 is not
aware of Y as that through which it apprehends X, nor as
part of X. But the mind, in apprehending X, t» Y: and Y
is a differentiated unity of awareness.
Before, however, we congratulate ourselves on our success,
it will be as well to consider what we have discovered. An
' awareness' is essentially an awareness of something: and
' modes of awareness' are distinguished as awarenesses of
different things. No doubt the expression is a vague one:
and we speak, e.g., of ' feeling' and ' thinking' as different
' modes of awareness '. We are then laying stress primarily
on the form of apprehension: but even here (if we will re-
flect) the difference of the ' form' conditions, and is con-
ditioned by, the difference in the ' matter' apprehended. We
may feel the beauty of a work of art: and on the other hand,
at a different level of experience, in a different ' form' or
1
 mode' of awareness, we may attain to an intelligent or
' thinking' appreciation of it. But the two experiences are
different through and through. And nothing but confusion
of mind and looseness of language could lead us to suppose
that the object apprehended is ' the same,' and that the
difference lies solely in the form of apprehending.
Nor are the ' steps' of the psychical process of judging
' mode* of awareness' in this more general sense. The
' awareness' in question is a unity of thinking, and its modes
are ' inflexions' of it. As such, they are different thoughts,
ie., thoughts of different things: for thus, and thus only, is
thought differentiated.
So the new phrases conceal after all no very startling
discovery, and our results may be stated more simply as
follows.
The mind apprehends many constituent elements as con-
tributing to a single meaning. This single meaning, de-
veloping for the mind throughout the many constituents
which it apprehends, is, in the fulness of its development,
X—that which, in its judgment, the mind affirms and knows.
The many constituents, through which the meaning develops,
'Above, §§3, 4.
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are different objects of thought to the mind, and thus ' differ-
ences of its thought' or different ' modes' of its apprehend-
ing. And as returning upon itself through the modifications
of its thought, the mind is for itself a jadgmg process, i.e., is
aware that it is judging and knowing X.
If we compare this account with the description with
which we began1 we may say either that the distinction
between ' process of apprehending' and ' object apprehended'
has now, to all intents and purposes, vanished: or that we
have introduced the notion of ' process' into our conception
of the ' object' apprehended. For what we are now describ-
ing as Y—the process of judging X—is X itself, with the
reservation that X, in its development and in its complete-
ness, is ' for the mind '. The reservation is made: but there
is no attempt to explain or to analyse the ' apprehending'
of the mind, or that aspect of X in which it is ' for ' the
mind. The whole emphasis is now laid on the differences
within the development of X. For X is now described as
the emergence of a single meaning, developing through a
succession of different contributory meanings. The ' steps '
in this 'process' are, in fact, 'presentations' to a mind,
different objects of thought. And perhaps it is these—or
some of these—which the psychologist discriminates as
' Images,' ' Ideas' or ' Symbols'. He is describing certain
kinds of object which ' pass before the mind,' the differences
in the order of their passing and the -conditions of their
grouping. And the phenomena thus described are without
doubt important subjects of study. In certain experiences—
4.g., in Reverie—they form perhaps the whole of that which
we apprehend : and in many other experiences our primary
and main object of apprehension is complicated by the
mediation of these as contributory elements. But these
Ideas, Images and Symbols, and their grouping and inter-
relations, if we retain the distinction between process of appre-
hending and object apprehended, fall always on the latter side
of the division: and thus, in describing them, the psycho-
logist is doing the work of the logician. He is studying a
portion of the subject-matter of Logic, mapping out a few
of the districts within the logicians territory. And he is
doing so imperfectly, in so far as he does not recognise fully
what he is doing. He is studying phenomena essentially
subsidiary to the more complicated phenomena, which he
assigns to Logic. For Reverie, Memory, Imagination, etc.,
are rudimentary forms of knowledge, ' modes of thinking '
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in which we indirectly and imperfectly apprehend the real.
And if they are to be thoroughly understood, they must be
viewed as Logic would view them, trie., in their relationship
to the more developed forms in which the ' logical' en-
deavour—the endeavour to know—is more fully explicit and
conscious.
§10. "But after all," it will be said, "we do think ' in '
words, or ideas, or images, ' in ' symbols or schemata of some
kind. If we recall an absent friend, or if we think of a
universal meaning, images unique and detailed pass before
our mind, and mediate our thought. The succession of
such unique images ' in '—or, if you prefer it, ' before'—our
mind, is the process of recollecting or conceiving: • and
the laws of their succession and association, together with
the principles of their representation of the ' meaning,' are
the subject-matter of Psychology. Psychical processes and
functions—Eeverie, e.g., Recollection, Conceiving aud Judg-
ing—doubtless present problems to Logic, and Psychology
cannot exhaust their whole significance. But Psychology
studies a determinate aspect of such facts, and its description
possesses a determinate and independent value."
Now the statement that we think ' in' ideas or images or
symbols is ambiguous. (1) We should all agree that thought
is inseparably one with its determinate inner expression:
that it is embodied and incarnate, and that ' pure thought'
—thought absolutely unexpressed and indeterminate—is non-
sense. But this truth, or truism, is irrelevant: nor is it well
expressed in the statement that " we think in ideas ". For
that invites misunderstanding. It suggests the absurdity of
a naked and shivering thought, waiting to select (from the
wardrobe of the mind) the clothes, in which it may make a
decent appearance. We do not ' think in ideas '. Ideas are
nothing unless quick with thought: and thus, they are the
incarnate life, the besouled body, which is our thought. (2)
And if it is meant that always—or, at least, often—we ap-
prehend our main object mediately through the apprehension
of something else, the statement, however true, is nothing to
the point. For if we study the secondary or 'mediating'
object, we are still not studying the process of apprehending
in any distinctive sense, which would entitle us to assign
our work to a distinct science. We are studying one kind
and one level of thought, i.e., of ' meaning' for a mind—
and our study is part and parcel of Logic. There need be
no quarrel about names: and provided we recognise the
character of the science, and that it is one, we need not
dispute whether it should be called Logic or Psychology.
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And though we cannot here profess to explain the character
of the science, we may indicate it by saying that it studies
the developing and developed meaning which is significant
thought, and does not study ' process of apprehending' or
' object apprehended ' in severance from one another.
(3) But the statement that we ' think in ideas ' means,
we may suspect, neither that our thought is concrete and
incarnate, nor that in some experiences ideas and images
are the objects apprehended. It means that we apprehend
the real through a veil of our own ideas. And this veil has
an inner and an outer side, and fulfils a double function.
For the ideas, images, or symbols are both states of our
mind, modes of our own apprehending consciousness, and
so unique and singular : and also objects apprehended, sym-
bolic of objects other than our own states, presentative or
mediative of the ' real'.
But the veil on its outer side (the ideas as objects ap-
prehended) clearly belongs to Logic : and on its inner side
(the ideas as modes of consciousness) it is possibly ' for' the
thinker himself, but assuredly ' for' no other mind.
The whole theory, indeed, if I have rightly understood it,
is radically false, and even dangerous. For we have a
succession of modes of consciousness, the unique and sin-
gular steps in the unique and singular process which is our
apprehending. The phases of this process, as phases of
apprehending, are reflected on themselves : i.e., the process
is, through and through, an awareness with itself for its
object. Its ' steps' are at one stroke phases of awareness,
and that of which those phases are awara And if this be
so, by what possible method are we ever to get beyond our
own self-feehng? What we are aware of, is, and remains to
all eternity, a phase of our own awareness; and it cannot
even be awareness of something as our own awareness, for
that would imply distinction from something not our own,
not a phase of our self.
On the other hand, if we emphasise the other moment in
the see-saw of the theory, we have a succession of ideas,
which, qud objects apprehended, are over against, and
distinct from, the apprehending. The apprehending is the
pure white light of inner vision, before which the variegated
show of * images' is displayed. The process of judging is
the procession of changing objects passing before the un-
changing ' eye ' of the mind. And yet this procession is
somehow alto a series of mental states. It passes ' through'
the mind, perhaps, or occurs ' within ' it, and its members
are ' ideas' or ' psychical facts '. The name, aided by the
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magic of this ' through ' and ' within,' completes our delu-
sion. We suppose that ' objects,' which as ideas pass
' through ' the mind or as psychical facts occur ' within ' it,
are more akin to thinking than ' the real,' the ' X,' the appre-
hending of which was to be explained. But if our awareness
of X requires explanation, the interposition of an ' idea '
between X and the mind is of no assistance. For if the
' idea' is apprehended, its apprehension is no whit more
intelligible than that of X. Whilst if the ' idea ' is not an
object apprehended, but a phase of apprehending, it is the
idea which apprehends X; and that has to be explained.
And if, finally, the idea is both apprehending and apprehended,
we are fairly committed to a theory destructive of all know-
ledge and all reality—to subjective Idealism in its purest
and most paradoxical form
§ 11. Let me briefly recapitulate. I began by setting out
a common distinction between ' logical content' as universal
and objective, and ' psychical process ' as unique and singular
and peculiar to the individual mind (§ 1).
This distinction may be used in a sense with which I
have no quarrel, or with which at least I am not at present
concerned. For it may be meant merely that the appre-
hended meaning as a whole is, from one point of view, some
individual subject's experience, and considered thus is ' psy-
chical process'; whilst, taken in abstraction from this its
occurrence, it is ' logical content'. That there is ' psychical
process ' in this sense is no doubt true : the real qud known
is known by somebody, and may so far be considered as
part of that somebody's history. The same applies, mutatis
mutandis, to the real qud willed and qud felt. Many novelists
(Balzac, e.g., or Henry James), many historians and writers-
of biography may be said to study and describe ' psychical
processes' and ' psychical facts' in this sense of the term.
Exactly what they are describing, and how they get their
data, are interesting and difficult problems: but I am not
here attempting to raise them, and I ruled out this sense
of ' psychical process ' in § 2.
The distinction, however, which was set out in § 1, may
be used in a totally different way. It may mean to sever,
within my knowing X, the X known from my knmoiny. And I
proceeded to inquire what a ' pychical process of judging,'
characterised in terms of the distinction thus used, could be.
I concluded that if, within my knowing X, the process of
knowing is severed from the content known : and if the
' psychical process,' which the distinction contrasts with the
logical content, is such a severed process of knowing:—then
6-
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'psychical process' is either nothing at all, or at any rate
nothing which I or anybody else can study (§§ 3-5).
Iu.§ 6 we reviewed the situation. We supposed the sever-
ance between object known and process of knowing still
to be maintained. But it was suggested that nevertheless
such ' psychical processes' might be the data of a scientific
inquiry. All sciences, it was urged, start from facts which
are singular and unique : and the psychologist might use
these uniquely-singular ' psychical processes' as the data
from which to begin his investigations.
We examined tnis defence in §§ 7, 8. We endeavoured to
•explain in what sense the facts of science are singular and
xmique, and why their ' unique singularity ' does not interfere
"with the scientific study of them: whilst, on the other hand,
the ' unique singularity,' which was supposed to characterise
'psychical processes,' would effectually prevent any appre-
hension of them as data for a science. ' Psychical facts,' we
might say, as so interpreted, are a contradiction in terms :
for qud ' psychical' they cannot be ' facts,' and qtid ' facts '
they have lost the characteristic in virtue of which they
were ' psychical'.
In § 9 we tried to develop the contrast between ' per-
ceptible things ' and a ' mind ' (a contrast sometimes obscured
by the metaphors of popular phraseology), and, on the basis
of this contrast, we suggested a new description of the ' pro-
cess of judging'. But we found that, in this new way of
looking at the matter, the distinction between ' psychical
process of judging' and ' content judged' vanishes altogether:
or, if it is in any sense retained, the whole subject-matter of
study falls on the side of content. And in place of two
sciences, we have but one—a more concrete science of Logic.
Final y, in § 10, we considered an appeal to our common
sense, the appeal that " clearly we do think in ideas ". We
exposed the ambiguity of the phrase ; and we showed that
it does not express any facts, which would support the
concept on of psychical process attacked in our preceding
arguments
§ 12. This paper has moved within very narrow limits,
and its upshot is ' much cry and little wool '. It has
criticised conceptions, which few people seriously hold, -and
which perhaps no one would willingly acknowledge. Yet
these ' conceptions'—if confusions of this kind deserve the
name—seem to me to lurk in mucih current philosophy, and
to wander at large in popular thought. And if here I am
mistaken, and am judging others by the frailties which I
detect in my own thinking: if no one but myself is ever in
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danger of sinking into this swamp of confusion : at least I
may hope to provoke discussion, and to be lifted by criticism
into the purer air and on to the firmer ground, where more
fortunate thinkers are accustomed to move.
Let me, in conclusion, venture to make a suggestion. It
has sometimes been supposed, to speak broadly and in the
rough, that the psychologist studies the processes and
functions of' consciousness, the elements of mind and the
laws of its mechanism. He reflects upon his own thinking,
feeling and willing, upon that of other persons, and, so far
as it is possible, upon that of the animals. And he may
thus attain to a systematic exposition of the general nature
of mind, and of the stages through which it necessarily
passes in the course of its evolution. Sometimes (if report
is to be believed) the prospect of this attainment has proved
too much for the sanity of the psychologist: and Psychology,
no longer content with the position of a ' special science,'
expands into the soientia scientiarum, which subordinates to
itself all philosophy. For ideals of art and conduct, religious
beliefs and metaphysical theories: what are these but in-
evitable products of the mechanism of mind at certain levels
of its development? And so, in this nightmare of a theory,
philosophy and all its branches—and, I presume, science as
well, and psychological science into the bargain—will appear
' in their right place' as corollaries and applications of
Psychology.
Now I would suggest that Psychology should begin, so to
say, at the other end, following the example which Plato
set in the Republic, and which Hegel fulfilled. The per-
sonality of the moral agent is revealed in the moral system,
in the social fabric, which it makes and sustains. The
personality of the thinker—the nature and functions of
mind as cognitive—is ' writ large' in knowledge. And
mind as emotional is broadly expressed in art and religion.
In Art and Morality, in Religion and Knowledge, the nature
and functions of mind are plain to read: and from the study
of them, the study of mind should start. Such a Psychology
would be essentially part of Metaphysics. For its subject-
matter would be the most developed and most significant
manifestations of the real:—mind incarnate in the universe
at the level and in' the forms of its self-conscious expression.
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